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 This appeal requires us to resolve the effect of two 
potentially conflicting provisions of federal law.  Section 
1113 of the Bankruptcy Code allows a Chapter 11 debtor to 
“reject” its collective bargaining agreements (CBAs) under 
certain circumstances.1  The National Labor Relations Act 
(NLRA) prohibits an employer from unilaterally changing the 
terms and conditions of a CBA even after its expiration.2  
Thus, under the NLRA, the key terms and conditions of an 
expired CBA continue to govern the relationship between a 
debtor-employer and its unionized employees until the parties 
reach a new agreement or bargain to impasse.  This case 
presents a question of first impression among the courts of 
appeals:  is a Chapter 11 debtor-employer able to reject the 
continuing terms and conditions of a CBA under § 1113 after 
the CBA has expired?   
 
 UNITE HERE Local 54 (Union) appeals the 
Bankruptcy Court’s order granting the Debtors’ motion to 
reject their CBA with the Union pursuant to § 1113(c).  The 
Union contends that the Bankruptcy Court lacked subject 
matter jurisdiction to approve the Debtors’ motion because 
the CBA had expired.  The Debtors, Trump Entertainment 
                                              
1 11 U.S.C. § 1113. 
2 See 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5); NLRB v. Katz, 369 U.S. 736, 743 
(1962) (holding that an employer commits an unfair labor 
practice if, without bargaining to impasse, it unilaterally 
changes existing terms or conditions of employment); Litton 
Fin. Printing Div. v. NLRB, 501 U.S. 190, 198 (1991) (citing 
Laborers Health & Welfare Trust Fund for N. Cal. v. 
Advanced Lightweight Concrete Co., 484 U.S. 539, 544 n.6 
(1988) (applying the Katz doctrine to expired CBAs)). 
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Resorts, Inc., and its affiliated debtors,3 contend that § 
1113(c) governs all CBAs, expired and unexpired, and that 
the Bankruptcy Court’s interpretation of § 1113 is consistent 
with the policies underlying the Bankruptcy Code.   
 
 We conclude that § 1113 does not distinguish between 
the terms of an unexpired CBA and the terms and conditions 
that continue to govern after the CBA expires.  Thus, we will 
affirm the order of the Bankruptcy Court. 
 
I.   
A.   
 The facts giving rise to this appeal are undisputed.  
The Debtors own and operate the Trump Taj Mahal casino in 
Atlantic City, New Jersey.  The casino employs 2,953 
employees, 1,467 of whom are unionized.  UNITE HERE 
Local 54 is the largest of the employee unions, representing 
1,136 employees.  The most recent CBA between the Union 
and Taj Mahal was negotiated in 2011 for a three-year term.  
It contained a duration provision – titled “term of contract” – 
that provided: 
 
The collective bargaining agreement shall 
remain in effect until 11:59 p.m. on September 
14, 2014 and shall continue in full force and 
effect from year to year thereafter, unless either 
party serves sixty (60) days written notice of its 
                                              
3 The affiliated debtors include Trump Taj Mahal Associates, 
LLC, the Union’s counter-party to the CBA. 
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intention to terminate, modify, or amend the 
Collective Bargaining Agreement. 
 
 In early 2014, due to the casino’s deteriorating 
financial health,4 the Debtors attempted to negotiate a new 
agreement.  Specifically, on March 7, the Debtors gave the 
Union notice of their “intention to terminate, modify or 
amend” the CBA and asked the Union to begin negotiations 
for a new agreement.  The Union did not respond.  On April 
10, the Debtors followed up on their request.  On April 30, 
the Union responded that “while [it is] also anxious to 
commence bargaining, the Union is simply not ready, some 
five months out [from expiration of the CBA], to commence 
negotiations” but it would “contact [the Debtors] within the 
next several months.”   
 
 On August 20, at the Debtors’ request, the Union met 
with the Debtors to discuss terms for a new agreement.  
Although the Debtors emphasized their critical financial 
situation, the Union was not receptive to negotiations.  On 
August 28, the Debtors proposed modifications to the CBA, 
including replacing the pension contributions with a 401(k) 
program, and replacing the health and welfare program with 
subsidized coverage under the Affordable Care Act.  The 
Union responded that it was prepared to work with the 
Debtors on workers’ pensions, but not on the health and 
welfare proposal.  No agreement was reached. 
                                              
4 In 2011, Taj Mahal’s earnings before interest, taxes, 
depreciation, and amortization (EBITDA) were 
approximately $32 million.  The casino’s earnings plummeted 
to a loss of $6.1 million in 2013.  As of June 30, 2014, Taj 
Mahal’s twelve-month EBITDA was a loss of $25.7 million. 
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 On September 9, 2014, the Debtors filed for Chapter 
11 bankruptcy protection.  On September 11, the Debtors 
asked the Union to extend the term of the CBA, but the Union 
refused, unless the Debtors agreed to terminate the extension 
upon the filing of a § 1113 motion.  It is undisputed that, with 
no new agreement in place and with the Debtors having 
served notice to modify the agreement, the CBA expired on 
September 14, 2014. 
   
 On September 17, the Debtors sent the Union a 
proposal with supporting documentation to demonstrate the 
Debtors’ “dire” financial condition, and requested to meet “on 
any day and at any place” within the next seven days.  The 
Union proposed to meet on September 24, for the first 
bargaining session.  After the meeting on September 24, the 
Union requested additional information, which the Debtors 
promptly provided.  Two days later, the Union sent a 
“counter-proposal” to the Debtors, which consisted largely of 
more information requests.  Also on September 26, the 
Debtors filed a motion pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 1113 seeking 
to reject the CBA and implement the terms of the Debtors’ 
last proposal to the Union.  The Debtors asserted that 
rejection of the CBA was necessary to their reorganization 
based on a three-part business plan, which anticipated 
concessions from the first lien lenders, local and state 
authorities, and the Union. 
 
 On October 17, 2014, following evidentiary hearings, 
the Bankruptcy Court granted the Debtors’ motion to reject 
the expired CBA and authorized the Debtors to implement 
their last proposal. 
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B.   
 In granting the Debtors’ motion, the Bankruptcy Court 
addressed three issues.  First, the court considered whether it 
had the authority to grant the motion to reject the CBA, given 
that the CBA had expired after the Debtors filed for 
bankruptcy but before the Debtors filed the rejection motion.  
The court concluded that § 1113 permits rejection of expired 
CBAs, reasoning that § 1113 is not limited to “unexpired” or 
“executory” CBAs.  The court observed that, in passing § 
1113 as a whole, Congress “recognized the need for an 
expedited process by which debtors could restructure labor 
obligations” and “provided several checks” to protect union 
employees.5  The court could not discern a reason for 
distinguishing between expired and unexpired CBAs because 
granting the union the power to delay the bankruptcy process 
would subvert the “policy and bargaining power balances 
Congress struck in Section 1113.”6   
 
 Having decided that § 1113 encompasses expired 
CBAs, the Bankruptcy Court determined that the Debtors 
satisfied the requirements of § 1113.  Specifically, the court 
found that the Debtors’ proposal provided “for those 
necessary modifications . . . that are necessary to permit the 
reorganization of the debtor;” that the Union rejected the 
proposal without good cause; and that the balance of the 
equities clearly favored rejection of the CBA.7  The 
Bankruptcy Court noted that, based on “uncontroverted 
                                              
5 In re Trump Entm’t Resorts, Inc., 519 B.R. 76, 86 (Bankr. 
D. Del. 2014). 
6 Id. at 87. 
7 See id. at 88-92; see generally 11 U.S.C. § 1113(b)(1). 
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evidence” at the hearing, the Debtors would be forced to close 
the casino and liquidate if the requested relief were not 
granted.8  The Bankruptcy Court also expressed concern that 
“while [the] Debtors were imploring the Union to engage 
with them in discussions, offering to meet ‘24/7,’ . . . the 
Union was engaging in picketing, a program of 
misinformation . . . and, most egregiously, communicating 
with customers who had scheduled conferences at the Casino 
to urge them to take their business elsewhere.”9  It was 
“clear” to the Bankruptcy Court that “the Union was not 
focusing its efforts on negotiating to reach agreement with 
Debtors.”10 
 
 Finally, the Bankruptcy Court determined that, under § 
1113, it could authorize the Debtors to modify the expired 
CBA and implement the terms of Debtor’s proposal.  The 
court observed that the text of § 1113 did not explicitly grant 
the court authority to implement the proposed terms, but the 
“reasoned view” is that a debtor in possession is authorized 
“to implement changes to the terms and conditions of 
employment that were included in the section 1113 proposals 
approved by the bankruptcy court.”11 
 
 The parties petitioned this Court for direct appeal,12 
which we granted on December 15, 2014.  The Union 
challenges only the first issue addressed by the Bankruptcy 
                                              
8 Id. at 87. 
9 Id. at 82. 
10 Id.; see id. at 81 (“The correspondence admitted into 
evidence is alarming in showing the Debtors were literally 
begging the Union to meet while the Union was stiff-arming 
the Debtors.”). 
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Court, whether a Bankruptcy Court may grant a motion to 
reject an expired CBA under § 1113.13  
 
 
II.  
 The Bankruptcy Court had jurisdiction under 28 
U.S.C. §§ 157(b) and 1334(a).14  We have jurisdiction under 
                                                                                                     
11 Id. at 92 (citing 7 Collier on Bankruptcy ¶ 1113.06[1][b] 
(16th ed. 2014)).   
12 See 28 U.S.C. § 158(d)(2). 
13 The Union raises the issue of whether the Bankruptcy 
Court had the authority to “implement changes in the post-
expiration terms and conditions of employment” in its 
Statement of Issue Presented for Review and in a single 
footnote in the Argument section of its brief, but does not 
articulate any arguments in support of review.  Because the 
Union does not pursue this argument in its briefing, we 
assume, without deciding, that the Bankruptcy Court had the 
authority to implement the terms of the § 1113 proposal. 
14 Although the Union contends that the Bankruptcy Court 
erred in finding that it has jurisdiction under 11 U.S.C. § 
1113, this case concerns the scope of a non-jurisdictional 
statute.  See Arbaugh v. Y&H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 515-16 
(2006).  The Bankruptcy Court’s interpretation of § 1113 did 
not violate the statute vesting the NLRB with exclusive 
jurisdiction to administer the NLRA.  See 29 U.S.C. § 160.  
As the Bankruptcy Court recognized, § 1113 allows the 
debtor only to terminate or modify its ongoing obligations to 
its employees; it does not give a bankruptcy court the 
authority to interpret or administer the NLRA.  See Trump 
Entm’t Resorts, Inc., 519 B.R. at 87 (“This is a no greater 
12 
 
28 U.S.C. § 158(d)(2)(A).  We review the Bankruptcy Court’s 
legal determinations de novo.15 
 
III. 
 The question before us is whether § 1113 authorizes a 
Chapter 11 debtor to reject the continuing terms and 
conditions of a CBA after its expiration.  Two statutory 
schemes are at issue:  the NLRA and Chapter 11 of the 
Bankruptcy Code.  We read these two statutory frameworks 
seriatim, and assume that Congress passed each subsequent 
law with full knowledge of the existing legal landscape.16   
 
                                                                                                     
intrusion on the NLRB’s jurisdiction than if the Court were to 
apply Section 1113 to a [CBA] which has not expired by its 
terms.”).  
15 In re Makowka, 754 F.3d 143, 147 (3d Cir. 2014).   
16 See Miles v. Apex Marine Corp., 498 U.S. 19, 32 (1990). 
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 Our role in interpreting a statute is to give effect to 
Congress’s intent.17  Because we presume that Congress 
expresses its intent through the ordinary meaning of its 
language, we begin our analysis by examining the plain 
language of the statute.18  When statutory “language is plain, 
the sole function of the courts—at least where the disposition 
required by the text is not absurd—is to enforce it according 
to its terms.”19   
 
 Bankruptcy courts are divided on whether § 1113 
permits debtors to reject expired CBAs.20  But a mere 
                                              
17 See Idahoan Fresh v. Advantage Produce, Inc., 157 F.3d 
197, 202 (3d Cir. 1998) (citing Negonsott v. Samuels, 507 
U.S. 99, 104 (1993)). 
18 See id. (citations omitted). 
19 Hartford Underwriters Ins. Co. v. Union Planters Bank, 
N.A., 530 U.S. 1, 6 (2000) (internal quotation marks omitted); 
see Parker v. NutriSystem, Inc., 620 F.3d 274, 277 (3d Cir. 
2010). 
20 Compare In re 710 Long Ridge Rd. Operating Co., II, 518 
B.R. 810, 830 (Bankr. D.N.J. 2014) (holding that § 1113(c) 
applies to CBAs that had expired prepetition), In re 
Karykeion, Inc., 435 B.R. 663, 675 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 2010) 
(same), In re Ormet Corp., No. 2:04-CV-1151, 2005 WL 
2000704, at *2 (S.D. Ohio 2005) (same), In re Hoffman Bros. 
Packing Co., 173 B.R. 177, 184 (9th Cir. BAP 1994) (holding 
that the CBA “continues ‘in effect,’ as recognized by § 
1113(e) and as was implicit in § 1113(c)”), Accurate Die 
Casting Co., 292 N.L.R.B. 982, 987-88 (1989) (dicta), with In 
re Hostess Brands, Inc., 477 B.R. 378, 382-83 (Bankr. 
S.D.N.Y. 2012) (holding that § 1113(c) is only applicable to 
current CBAs), In re San Rafael Baking Co., 219 B.R. 860, 
14 
 
divergence in statutory construction does not render § 1113 
ambiguous.21  Instead, we must determine whether § 1113 is 
ambiguous by examining “the language itself, the specific 
context in which that language is used, and the broader 
context of the statute as a whole.”22  “Specifically, in 
interpreting the Bankruptcy Code, the Supreme Court has 
been reluctant to declare its provisions ambiguous, preferring 
instead to take a broader, contextual view, and urging courts 
to ‘not be guided by a single sentence or member of a 
sentence, but look to the provisions of the whole law, and to 
its object and policy.’”23  A provision is ambiguous, “when, 
despite a studied examination of the statutory context, the 
                                                                                                     
866 (9th Cir. BAP 1998) (same), In re Sullivan Motor 
Delivery, Inc., 56 B.R. 28, 29, 31 (Bankr. E.D. Wis. 1985) 
(same), In re Charles P. Young Co., 111 B.R. 410, 413 
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1990) (noting that rejection of a CBA 
pursuant to § 1113(c) is a moot issue if the agreement expired 
by its own terms and before the bankruptcy court holds a 
hearing on rejection). 
21 See In re Price, 370 F.3d 362, 369 (3d Cir. 2004). 
22 Marshak v. Treadwell, 240 F.3d 184, 192 (3d Cir. 2001) 
(quoting Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 341 
(1997)); see King v. Burwell, 576 U.S. __, 135 S. Ct.2480, 
2489 (2015) (“But oftentimes the meaning–or ambiguity–of 
certain words or phrases may only become evident when 
placed in context.” (quotation marks omitted)). 
23 Price, 370 F.3d at 369; see Official Comm. of Unsecured 
Creditors of Cybergenics Corp., ex rel. Cybergenics Corp. v. 
Chinery, 330 F.3d 548, 559 (3d Cir. 2003) (“Statutory 
construction is a holistic endeavor, and this is especially true 
of the Bankruptcy Code.” (quotation marks, alterations and 
citations omitted)). 
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natural reading of a provision remains elusive.”24  In that 
case, and as a last resort, we turn to pre-Code practice and 
legislative history to find meaning.25  \ 
A.  
 Section 1113 of the Bankruptcy Code governs the 
means by which a debtor may assume, reject, or modify a 
CBA.  It establishes an expedited negotiation process for 
modifying a CBA and allows for judicial evaluation of a 
petition to reject a CBA if negotiations are unsuccessful.  
Specifically, § 1113 provides that a debtor may “reject a 
collective bargaining agreement” if the bankruptcy court 
determines that (1) the debtor has “ma[de] a proposal” to its 
employees “which provides for those necessary modifications 
in the employees benefits and protections that are necessary 
to permit the reorganization,” (2) “the authorized 
representative of the employees has refused to accept such 
proposal without good cause,” and (3) “the balance of the 
equities clearly favors rejection of such agreement.”26  
Section 1113 explicitly forbids debtors from “terminat[ing] or 
alter[ing] any provisions of a collective bargaining agreement 
prior to compliance with the provisions” of § 1113.27  
 
 The Union argues that the plain meaning of a 
“collective bargaining agreement” is a “contract between an 
employer and a labor union.”  Therefore, because the CBA 
has expired, there is no “contract” to be rejected under 
§ 1113.  The Union further contends that Debtors are required 
                                              
24 Price, 370 F.3d at 369. 
25 See id. 
26 11 U.S.C. § 1113(a), (b)(1), (c). 
27 Id. § 1113(f). 
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to bargain to impasse before making any changes to the key 
terms and conditions of the expired CBA.  The Union’s 
position is based on the NLRA’s requirement that “[o]nce a 
collective bargaining relationship has been established, an 
employer may not make a change affecting [the] mandatory 
bargaining subjects without affording the Union the 
opportunity to bargain over the change.”28  Even when a CBA 
expires, the employer must maintain the status quo with 
respect to mandatory subjects of bargaining until it either 
enters into a new contract or bargains to impasse.29   
 
 While § 1113 prescribes a process for rejection of a 
“collective bargaining agreement,” it does not mention the 
continuing obligations imposed by the NLRA.  However, 
neither does it restrict its prescription to “executory” or 
“unexpired” CBAs.30  Following the lead of the Supreme 
Court to take a broad, contextual view of the Bankruptcy 
                                              
28 Champion Parts Rebuilders, Inc. v. NLRB, 717 F.2d 845, 
852 (3d Cir. 1983) (citing Katz, 369 U.S. at 743)); see 29 
U.S.C. § 158(a)(5) (providing that it “shall be an unfair labor 
practice for an employer” to “refuse to bargain collectively 
with the representatives of [its] employees”); id. § 158(d) 
(defining the employer’s duty to bargain as part of a mutual 
duty between the employer and the union to “meet . . . and 
confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours, and other 
terms and conditions of employment”).  
29 See Litton, 501 U.S. at 199; Citizens Publ’g & Printing Co. 
v. NLRB, 263 F.3d 224, 233 (3d Cir. 2001). 
30 Cf. 11 U.S.C. § 365.  Section 365 permits unilateral 
rejection of any executory contracts or unexpired leases 
burdensome to the estate.  See Sharon Steel Corp. v. Nat’l 
Fuel Gas Distrib. Corp., 872 F.2d 36, 39 (3d Cir. 1989).   
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Code, we will not embark, as the parties do, on a hyper-
technical parsing of the words and phrases that comprise § 
1113,31 or focus on a meaning that may seem plain when 
considered in isolation.  We will turn instead to the situation 
in which § 1113 was enacted and examine the provision in the 
context of the Bankruptcy Code as a whole.32   
 
B. 
 Section 1113 was a product of the organized labor 
movement’s push to overturn the Supreme Court’s decision in 
                                              
31 The Union argues that we should attach significance to the 
textual contrast between § 1113(e), which allows for 
emergency interim relief “when the collective bargaining 
agreement continues in effect,” and § 1113(c).  The Union 
also contends that the word “terminate” within the context of 
§ 1113(d)(2) suggests that there must be an unexpired CBA 
that can be “terminated.”   
32 In re Price, 370 F.3d at 369 (“Statutory context can suggest 
the natural reading of a provision that in isolation might yield 
contestable interpretations.”); see King, 135 S. Ct. at 2495) 
(“But while the meaning of the phrase . . . may seem plain 
‘when viewed in isolation,’ such a reading turns out to be 
‘untenable in light of [the statute] as a whole.’ . . .  In this 
instance, the context and structure of the [statute] compel us 
to depart from what would otherwise be the most natural 
reading of the pertinent statutory phrase.” (citation omitted)); 
Kelly v. Robinson, 479 U.S. 36, 43 (1986) (“In expounding a 
statute, we must not be guided by a single sentence or 
member of a sentence, but look to the provisions of the whole 
law, and to its object and policy.”’ (quotation marks 
omitted)). 
18 
 
National Labor Relations Board v. Bildisco & Bildisco.33  
There, the Supreme Court addressed what standard governed 
rejection of CBAs in bankruptcy.  The Court first held that 
CBAs were “executory contracts” under § 365 of the 
Bankruptcy Code, and could therefore be rejected under § 
365 if the debtor showed that they “burden[ed] the estate, and 
. . . the equities balance[d] in favor of rejecting the labor 
contract[s].”34  In recognizing national labor policy, the Court 
included a bargaining component in the process of rejection, 
requiring an employer to make reasonable efforts to negotiate 
a voluntary modification of the CBA before acting on a 
                                              
33 465 U.S. 513 (1984); see 130 Cong. Rec. 20,092 (1984) 
(statement of Sen. Kennedy) (stating that the intent of the new 
law is “to overturn the Bildisco decision which had given the 
trustee all but unlimited discretionary power to repudiate 
labor contracts and to substitute a rule of law that encourages 
the parties to solve their mutual problems through the 
collective bargaining process”); id. at 20,091 (statement of 
Sen. Packwood) (stating that “the agreement reached by the 
Conferees on the labor provisions in the bill brings to an end 
the effort to assure that labor contracts, which are negotiated 
in good faith, are properly protected”); see also Wheeling-
Pittsburgh Steel Corp. v. United Steelworkers of Am., AFL-
CIO-CLC, 791 F.2d 1074, 1086 (3d Cir. 1986) (“[While we] 
are aware . . . that the most authoritative source of legislative 
intent lies in committee reports . . . [, here] there was no 
committee report, and we must seek guidance from the 
sequence of events leading to adoption of the final version of 
the bill, and the statements on the House and Senate floor of 
the legislators most involved in its drafting.” (citation 
omitted)).   
34 Bildisco, 465 U.S. at 526. 
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petition to modify or reject a CBA.35  This first holding of 
Bildisco – establishing the standard for rejecting a CBA – was 
unanimous.   
 The Court then addressed whether the debtor’s 
noncompliance with the CBA after filing for bankruptcy but 
before contract rejection constituted an unfair labor practice.  
Justice Rehnquist, writing for the majority, found that “from 
the filing of a petition in bankruptcy until formal acceptance, 
the [CBA] is not an enforceable contract within the meaning 
of NLRA § 8(d).”  Thus, it was not an unfair labor practice 
for an employer to unilaterally change the terms of a CBA 
after filing for bankruptcy but before the court approved 
rejection.36  Justice Rehnquist reasoned that the trustee was 
“empowered by virtue of the Bankruptcy Code to deal with 
its contracts and property in a manner it could not have 
employed absent a bankruptcy filing.”37  A rule, requiring 
trustees to adhere to a CBA’s terms after filing, “would run 
directly counter to the express provisions of the Bankruptcy 
Code and to the Code’s overall effort to give the debtor-in-
possession some flexibility and breathing space.”38  He noted:  
                                              
35 Id.  
36 Id. 529-33 (“Since the filing of a petition in bankruptcy 
under Chapter 11 makes the contract unenforceable, § 8(d) 
procedures have no application to the employer’s unilateral 
rejection of an already unenforceable contract. . . .  Our 
rejection of the need for full compliance with § 8(d) 
procedures of necessity means that any corresponding duty to 
bargain to impasse under § 8(a)(5) and § 8(d) before seeking 
rejection must also be subordinated to the exigencies of 
bankruptcy.”). 
37 Id. at 528. 
38 Id. at 532. 
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The fundamental purpose of reorganization is to 
prevent a debtor from going into liquidation, 
with an attendant loss of jobs and possible 
misuse of economic resources.  . . . [A] 
beneficial recapitalization could be jeopardized 
if the debtor-in-possession were saddled 
automatically with the debtor’s prior collective-
bargaining agreement.  Thus, the authority to 
reject an executory contract is vital to the basic 
purpose to a Chapter 11 reorganization, because 
rejection can release the debtor’s estate from 
burdensome obligations that can impede a 
successful reorganization.39 
 
 In response to Bildisco, Congress swiftly40 passed § 
1113 to overturn the second part of Bildisco’s holding and 
                                              
39 Id. at 528. 
40 See Rosalind Rosenberg, Bankruptcy and the Collective 
Bargaining Agreement – A Brief Lesson in the Use of the 
Constitutional System of Checks and Balances, 58 Am. 
Bankr. L.J. 293, 313 (1984) (“On the same day Bildisco was 
decided, Congressman Rodino introduced H.R. 4908 to 
clarify the circumstances under which collective bargaining 
agreements may be rejected.” (footnotes and quotation marks 
omitted)); 130 Cong. Rec. 6191 (statement of Rep. Hyde) 
(describing the House as taking action with “mind boggling 
speed”); 130 Cong. Rec. 13,205 (statement of Sen. Denton) 
(stating that “[i]t is notable that the Bildisco provision was 
introduced only 2 days before it was taken up on the floor, 
was never considered by the House Judiciary Committee in 
hearings or committee markups, and was brought to the 
21 
 
prohibit unilateral changes in debtors’ CBAs without 
bankruptcy court approval.41  In crafting the stringent 
requirements of § 1113, Congress was focused on preventing 
employers from terminating negotiated labor contracts and 
avoiding burdensome obligations to employees merely by 
entering bankruptcy.42 
 
 As enacted, § 1113 balances the concerns of 
economically-stressed debtors in avoiding liquidation and the 
unions’ goals of preserving labor agreements and maintaining 
                                                                                                     
House floor under a rule that did not permit the House to vote 
on it separately from the bankruptcy bill.”). 
41 See 11 U.S.C. § 1113(f). 
42 In re Roth Am., Inc., 975 F.2d 949, 956 (3d Cir. 1992); see 
In re Maxwell Newspapers, Inc., 981 F.2d 85, 89 (2d Cir. 
1992) (“[Section] 1113 also imposes requirements on the 
debtor to prevent it from using bankruptcy as a judicial 
hammer to break the union.”); In re Century Brass Prods., 
Inc., 795 F.2d 265, 272 (2d Cir. 1986) (“[Section 1113] 
created an expedited form of collective bargaining with 
several safeguards designed to insure that employers did not 
use Chapter 11 as medicine to rid themselves of corporate 
indigestion.”); Sullivan Motor Delivery, Inc., 56 B.R. at 30 
(“The elaborate procedure established under § 1113 is a 
conscious effort by Congress to slow down the potential for 
an avalanche of attempted rejections of [CBAs] by debtor 
employers.”); 130 Cong. Rec. 20,092 (1984) (statement of 
Sen. Packwood) (noting that “the debtor will not be able to 
exploit the bankruptcy procedure to rid itself of unwanted 
features of the labor agreement that have no relation to its 
financial condition and its reorganization and which earlier 
were agreed to by the debtor”). 
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influence in the reorganization process.  Unlike § 365, which 
does not constrain a debtor’s rejection of burdensome 
executory contracts, § 1113 prescribes strict procedural and 
substantive requirements before a CBA can be rejected.  
Specifically, before the bankruptcy court will consider an 
application to reject, the debtor must make a proposal, 
provide relevant information, meet at reasonable times, and 
confer in good faith.  The debtor’s modifications must be 
“necessary” to permit reorganization and must treat all 
creditors, the debtor, and all affected parties “fairly and 
equitably.”  The balance of equities must “clearly favor” 
rejection of the CBA.  The language of § 1113 was designed 
to foreclose all but the essential modifications of the working 
conditions integral to a successful reorganization.43  In other 
words, by requiring compliance with the stringent provisions 
of § 1113, Congress sought to ensure that, when the NLRA 
yields to the Bankruptcy Code, it does so only for reasons that 
will permit the debtor to stay in business.44   
 This case exemplifies the process that Congress 
intended.  Rejection of the Debtors’ continuing labor 
obligations, as defined by the expired CBA, is necessary to 
permit the Debtors’ reorganization – indeed it is essential to 
                                              
43 See Wheeling-Pittsburgh Steel Corp., 791 F.2d at 1088. 
44 See 130 Cong. Rec. 20,231 (1984) (statement of Rep. 
Morrison) (“[T]he conference report strikes the necessary 
balance between the threat to companies in risk of being 
liquidated because of financial problems and the possibility of 
abuse of chapter 11 bankruptcy proceedings merely to vitiate 
union contracts”); id. at 20,232 (statement of Rep. Morrison) 
(“[A] chapter 11 reorganization case that is brought for the 
sole purpose or [sic] repudiating or modifying a [CBA] is a 
case brought in ‘bad faith.’”). 
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the Debtors’ survival.  As the Bankruptcy Court repeatedly 
emphasized, the Debtors’ “financial situation is desperate.  
Not only are their losses large, but they have been unable to 
obtain debtor in possession financing for their bankruptcy 
cases and are operating with cash collateral.  Debtors’ cash 
will run out in less than two months.”45  The Debtors’ expert, 
whom the Bankruptcy Court found “highly credible,” testified 
that the  
 
Debtors must have relief from the CBA without 
which they can not avoid closing the Casino 
and liquidating their businesses. . . . [T]he 
situation is so grim that without the Court 
granting the Motion and Debtors obtaining 
other concessions, Debtors would have to give 
notice to the New Jersey Department of Gaming 
Enforcement not later than October 20, 2014, 
that Taj Mahal will close the Casino.46 
 
 The Debtors sold assets and closed one of their 
casinos, the Trump Plaza Hotel and Casino, to raise cash and 
reduce their obligations.  As of September 5, 2014, the 
Debtors’ working capital cash was approximately $12 
million, and its secured debt was approximately $286 million.  
Under the relevant terms of the CBA, however, the Debtors 
were required to make more than $3.5 million per year in 
pension contributions, and $10 to $12 million per year in 
health and welfare contributions.  After the CBA expired, the 
Debtors were required to sustain those payments at the same 
levels.  To avoid liquidation, the Debtors moved to reject the 
                                              
45 Trump Entm’t Resorts, Inc., 519 B.R. at 80. 
46 Id. 
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CBA.  Their § 1113 proposal to the Union included annual 
savings of approximately $3.7 million per year in pension 
contributions, $5.1 million in health and welfare 
contributions, and $5.8 million in work rule changes, 
including elimination of paid meal times.  Instead of 
negotiating with the Debtors, the Union stalled the bargaining 
sessions, engaged in picketing, and attempted to harm the 
Debtors’ business.47   
 
 Notably, the Debtors’ plan of reorganization is 
contingent on rejection of the CBA, the obtaining of tax 
relief, the conversion of the first lien secured creditor’s debt 
to equity, and a capital infusion of $100 million from the first 
lien secured creditor.  The first lien secured creditor “has 
made it clear that it will perform only if the CBA and tax 
relief contingencies are achieved because the business will 
not succeed without the relief.”48  A successful 
reorganization, therefore, depends on the rejection of the 
terms that the Debtors are required to maintain under the 
NLRA. 
 
 The Union recognizes that the Debtors are bound by 
the terms and conditions of the expired CBA by virtue of their 
obligation to maintain the status quo.  Nevertheless, the 
Union argues that those obligations are “entirely distinct from 
the parties’ voluntarily assumed contractual obligation to 
honor their CBA prior to its expiration.”  The Union relies on 
Laborers Health & Welfare Trust Fund for Northern 
California v. Advanced Lightweight Concrete Company.49  
                                              
47 Id. at 81-82.  
48 Id. at 83. 
49 484 U.S. 539 (1988). 
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This case involved the withdrawal of an employer from a 
multiemployer pension fund and the employer’s subsequent 
failure to make payments to the fund as required by the 
expired CBA.  The trustee of the fund brought suit in federal 
court to enforce the terms of the expired CBA.  The Supreme 
Court distinguished an employer’s obligation to make 
contributions to such a pension fund pursuant to the terms of 
a CBA from an employer’s continuing obligation under the 
NLRA to make post-expiration contributions.  The Court held 
that, because an employer’s contractual duty to make 
multiemployer pension fund contributions does not survive 
the CBA’s expiration, the employer’s failure to make post-
expiration contributions does not constitute a violation of § 
515 of ERISA.50  The Court concluded that § 515 was 
intended to cover only obligations arising under the CBA.  To 
seek contributions from an employer after the expiration of 
the CBA, the trustee would have to go before the NLRB to 
obtain a remedy in a proceeding before that body; the district 
court did not have jurisdiction to hear the claim.   
 
 The Court in Laborers Health found Congress’s intent 
in enacting § 515 was clear.51  The Court added that there 
were three countervailing policy arguments to support its 
decision that the reach of § 515 was deliberate rather than 
inadvertent.  First, if there is a gap in the enforcement scheme 
to enforce contributions to multiemployer funds, its incidence 
                                              
50 Section 515 was enacted to protect multiemployer funds 
and the other employers participating in them from the 
withdrawal of an employer from the fund.  It obligates 
employers, even after withdrawal, to make contributions 
under the terms of a plan or of a CBA.  29 U.S.C. § 1145. 
51 Laborers Health, 484 U.S. at 551. 
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is unknown and, since it has not been called to the attention of 
Congress, “it may not be a problem of serious magnitude.”52  
Second, the issues to be decided in a dispute over an 
employer’s failure to make fund contributions are more 
complex when the refusal is post-CBA rather than a simple 
collection action during the life of the CBA.53  Third, a 
violation of the duty to bargain in good faith is a labor law 
matter and is better decided by the NLRB than by a district 
court.54  
 
 Conversely, we find the intent of Congress here also to 
be clear but that intent was to incorporate expired CBAs in 
the language of § 1113.  Our review of the decision in 
Laborers Health demonstrates to us that the three 
countervailing policy arguments in Laborers Health support 
our decision here.  As we noted above, § 1113 was enacted to 
balance the needs of economically-stressed debtors in 
avoiding liquidation and the unions’ needs in preserving labor 
agreements and safeguarding employment for their members.  
Section 1113 meets a gap in the schemes to permit 
reorganizations when labor obligations will prevent the 
success of a reorganization.  The number of cases cited in 
footnote 20 supra demonstrate this gap.  Section 1113 was 
enacted to ensure that relief from a CBA was granted only in 
situations where relief was necessary to permit the 
reorganization.  It is a counter to the precedent in Bildisco 
which permitted modification of a CBA without close 
scrutiny by the Bankruptcy Court.  Under § 1113, approval 
will be granted only if the debtor’s modifications are 
                                              
52 Id.. 
53 Id. at 551-52.   
54 Id. at 552. 
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necessary to permit reorganization.  In this context, when the 
employer’s statutory obligations to maintain the status quo 
under the terms of an expired CBA will undermine the 
debtor’s ability to reorganize and remain in business, it is the 
expertise of the Bankruptcy Court which is needed rather than 
that of the NLRB.  For that reason, whether the CBA is in 
effect or is expired, it is the Bankruptcy Court which should 
make the review and decide on the necessity of the 
modification.  We conclude, therefore, that § 1113 applies to 
a CBA after it has expired.  
   
 The Union contends, however, that because a debtor 
may not assume or reject an expired executory contract under 
§ 365, it may not reject an expired CBA under § 1113.  This 
argument ignores an important distinction between a CBA 
and any other executory contract:  the key terms and 
conditions of a CBA continue to burden the debtor after the 
agreement’s expiration.  Rejection of those terms, therefore, 
is not a moot issue as would be in the case of other contracts 
or leases.   
 
C. 
  To hold that a debtor may reject an expired CBA or its 
continuing obligations as defined by the expired CBA is also 
consistent with the purpose of the Bankruptcy Code, which 
gives debtors latitude to restructure their affairs.55  A Chapter 
                                              
55 See Perez v. Campbell, 402 U.S. 637, 648 (1971) (“This 
Court on numerous occasions has stated that ‘(o)ne of the 
primary purposes of the Bankruptcy Act’ is to give debtors ‘a 
new opportunity in life and a clear field for future effort, 
unhampered by the pressure and discouragement of pre-
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11 reorganization provides a debtor with an opportunity to 
reduce or extend its debts so its business can achieve long-
term viability, for instance, by generating profits which will 
compensate creditors for some or all of any losses resulting 
from the bankruptcy.  Congress has recognized that “[i]t is 
more economically efficient to reorganize rather than to 
liquidate, because it preserves jobs and assets.”56  Similarly, 
we have held that “[t]he policy behind Chapter 11 of the 
Bankruptcy Code is the ‘ultimate rehabilitation of the 
debtor.’”57  As the Bankruptcy Court recognized, “[i]n many 
cases, time is the enemy of a successful restructuring” and the 
§ 1113 rejection process is a “much quicker process than the 
relatively protracted process contemplated by the NLRA.”58 
 
 Section 1113 furthers the Code’s rehabilitative policies 
by permitting debtors to restructure their labor obligations.  A 
                                                                                                     
existing debt.’” (quoting Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 
234, 244 (1934))).  
56 H.R. Rep. No. 95-595, at 220 (1977) (stating that the 
premise of business reorganization is that a company’s assets 
are worth more as a going concern than if sold for scrap); see 
130 Cong. Rec. 20,230 (1984) (statement of Rep. Lungren, 
discussing § 1113) (“This is an important provision in the 
compromise because it underscores the primary purpose of 
chapter 11; that is, to maintain the debtor’s business so that 
both the debtor and his employees can keep their jobs. . . . 
[T]his chapter 11 allows a company to reorganize rather than 
going belly-up.  In essence, it is the best way to protect the 
jobs of the workers of the company as then constituted.”). 
57 In re Exide Techs., 607 F.3d 957, 962 (3d Cir. 2010) 
(quoting Nicholas v. United States, 384 U.S. 678, 687 (1966). 
58 Trump Entm’t Resorts, 519 B.R. at 86. 
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contrary holding, i.e., that § 1113 does not allow a debtor to 
reject expired CBAs or its ongoing obligations, would impede 
that overriding goal.59  Whether by force of contract or by 
operation of the NLRA, the Debtors here were bound by the 
key terms of the expired CBA.  But those terms burdened the 
estate so as to preclude a successful reorganization.  Just 
because the Debtors filed the § 1113 motion one week after 
the CBA expired, they should not be bound by the expired 
agreement’s burdensome terms until the parties negotiate to 
impasse.  That interpretation of the statute would undercut the 
rehabilitative function of Chapter 11.60 
 
                                              
59 See 130 Cong. Rec. 20,230 (1984) (statement of Rep. 
Lungren) (noting that “[a]ny labor provision which would 
subordinate the debtor’s reorganization to a union contract . . . 
would impinge on the goals of the 1978 Bankruptcy Reform 
Act and indeed on the principal reasons for a bankruptcy 
procedure”); id. at 20,231 (statement of Rep. Hall) (asking 
whether “the court in balancing equities would include the 
union contract – and any other matters that might make it 
detrimental to the debtor for the contract to remain in force” 
(emphasis added)). 
60 See King, 135 S. Ct. 2492-93 (citing N.Y. State Dep’t of 
Soc. Servs. v. Dublino, 413 U.S. 405, 419-20 (1973) (“We 
cannot interpret federal statutes to negate their own stated 
purposes.”)); SEC v. C.M. Joiner Leasing Corp., 320 U.S. 
344, 350-51 (1943) (“[C]ourts will construe the details of an 
act in conformity with its dominating general purpose, will 
read text in the light of context and will interpret the text so 
far as the meaning of the words fairly permit so as to carry 
out in particular cases the generally expressed legislative 
policy.”). 
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 Under the policies of bankruptcy law, it is preferable 
to preserve jobs through a rejection of a CBA, as opposed to 
losing the positions permanently by requiring the debtor to 
comply with the continuing obligations set out by the CBA.  
Moreover, it is essential that the Bankruptcy Court be 
afforded the opportunity to evaluate those conditions that can 
detrimentally affect the life of a debtor, whether such 
encumbrances attach by operation of contract or a complex 
statutory framework.  In light of Chapter 11’s overarching 
purposes and the exigencies that the Debtors faced, we 
conclude that the Bankruptcy Court did not err in granting the 
Debtors’ motion.  
 
IV. 
 For the reasons set forth above, we will affirm the 
judgment of the Bankruptcy Court.  
